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CAN BAD LAW DO GOOD? A RETROSPECTIVE ON CONFLICT 
MINERALS REGULATION 
KAREN E. WOODY* 
ABSTRACT 
 Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) created a novel ap-
proach to corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) in supply chains 
by requiring public companies to disclose the presence of conflict 
minerals in their products.  Dodd-Frank, as a whole, has faced a 
barrage of criticism since its passage, and Section 1502 was not 
immune from intense critical backlash.  As I argued in prior schol-
arship and congressional testimony, Section 1502 was ill-con-
ceived in substance and form.  Its application resulted in the im-
proper use of securities laws to the detriment of its laudable public 
international law goals.  This Article will address whether, despite 
the structural and consequential shortcomings of the provision, it 
nevertheless has had positive normative effects related to both con-
sumer and corporate awareness and behavior.  In other words, this 
Article will consider whether the functional effects of the law have 
“moved the needle” in the direction of its intent, despite the provi-
sion’s potentially fatal flaws.  This inquiry will address the ques-
tion of whether there is a function and purpose of “bad law.”  
Given that the fate of Section 1502 hangs largely in the balance at 
present, and the current administration has indicated that it will 
not provide funds for the implementation of Section 1502, the time 
is ripe for an analysis of the effectiveness of Section 1502 to date.  
This Article will use a retrospective lens to analyze the effect of 
Section 1502 on transparency within corporate supply chains, con-
sumer behavior and awareness, and corporate social responsibil-
ity.  In doing so, this Article will consider the broader question 
surrounding the effects bad law can have in society. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, in response to the financial crisis of 2008, Congress passed a 
sweeping bill aimed at restructuring much of the existing financial regulatory 
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landscape.1  Amongst its many finance-related provisions, Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) also 
includes a Section entitled “Miscellaneous Provisions.”2  Included in this 
aptly-named chapter of Dodd-Frank are regulations relating to mine safety, 
extractive industry disclosures, International Monetary Fund evaluations, 
and, of course, conflict minerals disclosures.  The conflict minerals provision, 
Section 1502, requires issuing companies to disclose whether they use any of 
the minerals included in the “conflict minerals” definition3 and to locate the 
source of the minerals.4 
Eight years after the passage of Dodd-Frank, and roughly six years since 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) put in place regulations 
regarding conflict minerals, the fate of the provision is very much up in the 
air.  As detailed in Part I, the provision faced a robust constitutional challenge 
in the courts, as well as intense pressure from the Trump Administration to 
repeal it altogether.  For this reason, it is timely to consider the provision 
through a holistic yet retrospective lens in order to take account of the lessons 
learned from this novel legislative experiment and to avoid similar legislative 
failures.5 
This Article will incorporate the presumption that Section 1502 was set 
up to fail at its inception and will analyze whether those failures were mani-
fested over the first six years of its implementation.  In order to incorporate 
this presumption, it is worth unpacking the elements of Section 1502.  There 
were three reasons that the provision was set up to fail, ex ante, which ren-
dered the provision “bad law.” 
First, Section 1502 is bad law because it amended a fundamental pillar 
of securities law, yet the provision has nothing to do with securities, the 
health of an investment, investor protection, or any other financial-related 
information.6  Section 1502 bastardized securities law by mandating disclo-
sure of immaterial information.  Furthermore, Section 1502 is situated in the 
body of securities law, as it amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(“Exchange Act”)7 to require these disclosures be made to the SEC; thus, the 
                                                          
 1.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010).  
 2.  Id. title XV.  
 3.  See id. § 1502(e)(4) (defining conflict mineral as “columbite-tantalite (coltan), cassiterite, 
gold, wolframite, or their derivatives; or any other mineral or its derivatives determined by the Sec-
retary of State to be financing conflict in the [DRC] or an adjoining country”). 
 4.  See id. § 1502(b). 
 5.  See Jeff Schwartz, The Conflict Minerals Experiment, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 129 (2016); 
David Zaring, Financial Reform’s Internationalism, 65 EMORY L. J. 1255 (2016).   
 6.  See infra Section II.A. 
 7.  Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.). 
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disclosure requirement applies to companies that have existing disclosure re-
quirements—that is, public companies.  Moreover, the disclosure require-
ment applies only to public companies that have products in the stream of 
commerce, not the middlemen suppliers to those companies, even if those 
middlemen suppliers are also public companies.  In other words, one of the 
structural failures of Section 1502 is that it does not cover the full universe 
of companies involved in the mineral industry or supply chain. 
Second, Section 1502 is bad law because it set up a wholly ineffectual 
public international solution to the crisis in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (“DRC”).8  Establishing a de facto embargo against the DRC and its 
neighbors was not a tenable solution to the violence in the region and was 
short-sighted in terms of its effects on the global market for minerals.  Indeed, 
as detailed in Part III, the de facto embargo that the provision sparked ended 
up hurting more than helping the people of the DRC and created a black mar-
ket for minerals.  In addition, the de facto embargo fueled, and continues to 
fuel, a vibrant international conflict minerals market for companies located 
beyond the jurisdiction of Section 1502. 
Third, Section 1502 is bad law by virtue of its own legislative penalty 
structure.9  Section 1502 does not include any penalties for the use of conflict 
minerals; rather, the provision is entirely a “name and shame” regulation.  
Because there is no sanction for continued use of conflict minerals, provided 
the company using the minerals merely discloses that use, the provision itself 
is essentially toothless ab initio. 
Given these structural shortcomings of Section 1502, this Article will 
address whether there have been normative shifts in corporate and consumer 
behavior that mitigate the failings of the legislation.  In addition, this Article 
will take the broader view of analyzing how Section 1502 can serve as an 
example for creating, or at least shifting, soft law normative behavior.  In 
other words, the major takeaway from the flaws of Section 1502 is that the 
provision should be seen as an example of hard law influencing soft law, 
given that a shift in soft law is the only true measurable result of Section 
1502.10  That is, because there will be no enforcement actions against com-
panies for the use of conflict minerals, the hard law is rendered meaning-
less.11  Yet the abject failure of the hard law sets up a valid debate over the 
                                                          
 8.  See infra Section II.B. 
 9.  See infra Section II.C. 
 10.  Though scholars assert that there is some disagreement surrounding the definitions of “hard 
law” and “soft law,” the general definitions to which I will ascribe for purposes of the argument set 
forth in this Article is that hard law represents the binding, codified law, whereas soft law represents 
the non-binding customs and normative behavioral principles.  See generally Gregory C. Shaffer & 
Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International 
Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 712–17 (2010) (outlining the literature regarding definitions of 
hard and soft law).   
 11.  See infra Part II and accompanying notes.  
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role of soft law as a tool in moving the needle toward better supply chain 
transparency and more conscious corporations and consumers.  Section 1502, 
in essence, is an example of the softening of hard law.  
This Article is organized as follows.  Part I will introduce and outline 
the requirements of Section 1502 and its legislative intent.  This Part will 
include an overview of the legal challenges to Section 1502.  Part II will dis-
cuss the aforementioned shortcomings of Section 1502 from three different 
standpoints: securities law, public international law, and the legislative struc-
ture.  Part III will consider whether Section 1502 has been “successful.”  In 
framing the effects of Section 1502, this Part will analyze the impact of Sec-
tion 1502 in four separate arenas: (1) the effects upon the DRC, (2) the num-
ber of conflict mineral reports filed by issuing companies in the United 
States, (3) the changes in consumer behavior resulting from this provision, 
and (4) the promulgation of similar regulations in other jurisdictions.  Finally, 
Part IV will address the lessons that can be learned from this legislative hard 
law “failure,” dissect the phenomenon of the softening of hard law, and dis-
cuss how those lessons can be applied going forward. 
I.  CONFLICT MINERALS REGULATION: DODD-FRANK SECTION 1502 
A.  Background of Section 1502 
The failure of Section 1502 stems from its legislative genesis.  The goals 
and structure of the provision set it up to be a legislative dud.  Before outlin-
ing the legislative history and intent of Section 1502, however, one must un-
derstand a bit about the history of the DRC.  That is, in order to appreciate 
the goals of the legislation, one must contextualize the impact the crisis in the 
DRC had upon those drafting the legislation. 
The eastern region of the DRC continues to be one of the deadliest re-
gions of the world.  Various conflicts in the region have claimed more lives 
than World War II.12  “Fueled by decades of ethnic tensions, the conflict in 
the region reached” unprecedented heights “when groups of militiamen fled 
across the border into the DRC following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.”13  
The DRC is the world’s eleventh largest country by size, yet ranks last in 
                                                          
 12.  See generally JASON K. STEARNS, DANCING IN THE GLORY OF MONSTERS: THE COLLAPSE 
OF THE CONGO AND THE GREAT WAR OF AFRICA (2012); see also Nicholas Kristof, Op-Ed, Death 
by Gadget, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/27/opinion/27kris-
tof.html (noting that over 5.4 million people have been killed in the DRC as a result of the conflict); 
Joe Bavier, Congo War-Driven Crisis Kills 45,000 a Month, REUTERS (Jan. 22, 2008), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-democratic-death/congo-war-driven-crisis-kills-45000-
a-month-study-idUSL2280201220080122. 
 13.  See Karen E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC’s New Role As Diplomatic 
and Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1318 & n.8 (2012) (noting the DRC has 
been embroiled in ethnic tensions “for over a century”).  
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gross domestic product (“GDP”) per capita.14  Moreover, the DRC ranks 156 
out of 162 in assessments of peacefulness.15 
Although not the underlying cause of the wars and ethnic battles, min-
eral resources in the region supply the funding necessary for local rebel mi-
litias to continue terrorizing the region.16  The DRC is the textbook example 
of a region that experiences the “resource curse”—that is, a country with an 
abundance of natural resources that paradoxically has less economic growth, 
less democracy, and worse developmental outcomes than those countries 
with fewer natural resources. 17 
In 2001, the United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”) issued a reso-
lution condemning “all illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the 
[DRC], demand[ing] that such exploitation cease and stress[ing] that the nat-
ural resources of the [DRC] should not be exploited to finance the conflict in 
that country.”18  The UNSC then called on member states to “take measures, 
as they deem appropriate, to ensure that importers, processing industries and 
consumers of Congolese mineral products under their jurisdiction exercise 
due diligence on their suppliers and on the origin of the minerals they pur-
chase.”19 
After the United Nations (“UN”) condemned the activities occurring in 
the DRC, yet before the passage of Dodd-Frank in 2010, several members of 
Congress and then-United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited 
the DRC to press the Congolese government to promote a humanitarian 
agenda and reduce violence in the country.20  Congressional concern, partic-
ularly by Senator Richard Durbin (D-Ill.), then-Senators Sam Brownback (R-
Kan.) and Russell Feingold (D-Wis.), and Congressman Jim McDermott (D-
                                                          
 14.  Dominic P. Parker & Bryan Vadheim, Resource Cursed or Policy Cursed? US Regulation 
of Conflict Minerals and Violence in the Congo, 4 J. ASS’N ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECONOMISTS 1, 
2 (2017).  
 15.  Id.  
 16.  Shannon Raj, Note, Blood Electronics: Congo’s Conflict Minerals and the Legislation that 
Could Cleanse the Trade, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 981, 985 (2011); JOHN PRENDERGAST & SASHA 
LEZHNEV, ENOUGH PROJECT, FROM MINE TO MOBILE PHONE: THE CONFLICT MINERALS SUPPLY 
CHAIN 5 (2009), http://www.enoughproject.org/files/publications/minetomobile.pdf (noting that the 
exports from neighboring countries, including Uganda and Rwanda, have increased exponentially 
despite the production and mining of those minerals domestically does not match the export num-
bers).   
 17.  The literature on the resource curse is abundant and found mainly within the canon of eco-
nomics and political science.  See, e.g., Paul Collier & Benedikt Goderis, Commodity Prices and 
Growth: An Empirical Investigation, 56 EUR. ECON. REV. 1241 (2012); Paul Collier & Anke Hoef-
fler, On Economic Causes of Civil War, 50 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 563 (1998); Ola Olsson, Con-
flict Diamonds, 82 J. DEV. ECON. 267, 268 (2007) (“In countries with weak institutions, natural 
resources are likely to be a curse . . . .”); Michael L. Ross, What Have We Learned About the Re-
source Curse?, 18 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 239 (2015).  
 18.  S.C. Res. 1376, ¶ 8 (Nov. 9, 2001). 
 19.  S.C. Res. 1857, ¶ 15 (Dec. 22, 2008). 
 20.  See Woody, supra note 13, at 1324 & n.49.  
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Wash.), culminated in the creation of Section 1502 of Dodd-Frank.21  Their 
concern arose after these members of Congress and others visited the region 
and saw first-hand some of the human rights atrocities occurring in the DRC.  
Out of a sense of moral responsibility, this bipartisan group decided to pass 
legislation to tackle issues in the DRC.22 
The curious story about how Section 1502 of Dodd-Frank came into 
existence is an interesting study in legislative sausage-making.  Section 1502 
was not the first attempt at this type of legislation.  As early as 2006, varia-
tions of legislation similar to Section 1502 had been put forth by members of 
Congress, often by Senator Brownback.23  In May 2008, Senator Brownback 
introduced a bill in the Senate Finance Committee, co-sponsored by Senator 
Durbin, called the Conflict Coltan and Cassiterite Act of 2008 (“CCCA”).24  
This bill would have made it unlawful to import products from the DRC that 
contain coltan or cassiterite, two of the four minerals that comprise the “con-
flict minerals” definition ultimately found in Section 1502.25 
The CCCA never made it to the congressional floor for a vote.26  Less 
than one year later, however, Senator Brownback again introduced legisla-
tion to address the humanitarian crisis in the DRC.27  The Congo Conflict 
Minerals Act of 2009 (“CCMA”) was less punitive than the CCCA in that it 
did not include criminal penalties for willfully violating the CCMA’s provi-
sions.28  In this way, the CCMA closely resembled the eventual Dodd-Frank 
                                                          
 21.  See 156 CONG. REC. 8680–81 (2010) (statement of Sen. Feingold) [hereinafter Feingold 
Statement] (“This amendment specifically responds to the continued crisis in the eastern region of 
the [DRC].  Despite efforts to curb the violence, mass atrocities and widespread sexual violence and 
rape continue at an alarming rate.  Some have justifiably labeled eastern Congo as ‘the worst place 
in the world to be female.’  Several of us in this body, including Senators Brownback and Durbin 
and I, have traveled to this region and seen first-hand the tragedy of this relentless crisis.”).  
 22.  Id. at 8681.   
 23.  The first attempt at this type of legislation occurred in 2006 with the Democratic Republic 
of Congo Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-456, 120 Stat. 
3384 (2006).   
 24.  Conflict Coltan and Cassiterite Act of 2008, S. 3058, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 25.  Id. §§ 3, 4. 
 26.  See All Actions S.3058—110th Congress (2007-2008), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.con-
gress.gov/bill/110th-congress/senate-bill/3058/all-actions (last visited Jan. 13, 2019).  
 27.  Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009, S. 891, 111th Cong. (2009).  Similar legislation was 
proposed in the House of Representatives by Representative Jim McDermott (D-WA).  See Conflict 
Minerals Trade Act, H.R. 4128, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 28.  See Woody, supra note 13, at 1325 & n.58.  Compare S. 891, with S. 3058.  According to 
Senator Feingold,  
[W]e must tread carefully because there are many communities in eastern Congo whose 
livelihoods are intertwined with the mining economy.  All-out prohibitions or blanket 
sanctions could be counterproductive and negatively affect the very people we seek to 
help.  I am confident that [the CCMA] is sensitive to that complex reality. 
155 CONG. REC. 10600 (2009) (statement of Sen. Feingold). 
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Section 1502.29  Like Section 1502, the CCMA would have amended the Ex-
change Act by adding certain disclosure requirements, and it would have 
made it United States policy to “promote peace and security in” the DRC.30  
This prior iteration of Section 1502 is noteworthy because many assume that 
situating Section 1502 within the securities laws was due in part to the fact 
that Dodd-Frank was a financial reform bill.31  That is, the “link” that tied 
Section 1502 to the rest of the bill was that it was essentially a securities 
disclosure provision.  However, earlier iterations of Section 1502 already en-
visioned this legislation as a disclosure requirement for public companies. 
The prologue to Section 1502 is of particular importance in analyzing 
the provision as a securities law provision.  It states: 
It is the sense of Congress that the exploitation and trade of conflict 
minerals originating in the [DRC] is helping to finance conflict 
characterized by extreme levels of violence in the eastern [DRC], 
particularly sexual- and gender-based violence, and contributing to 
an emergency humanitarian situation therein, warranting the pro-
visions of [S]ection 13(p) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
as added by subsection (b).32 
As will be discussed in detail in Part II, the goals of Section 1502 set it 
up for failure.  The stated aim of the provision is the reduction, or even erad-
ication, of violence in the DRC.  The means of reaching that goal, according 
to Congress, is a disclosure provision directed at companies with reporting 
responsibilities to the SEC.  The tenuous link between the means and ends 
set the stage for both the legal challenge to Section 1502 and the bulk of my 
analysis of why Section 1502 is bad law. 
                                                          
 29.  There were, however, several differences between the CCMA and Section 1502, including 
the scope of those to whom the bill applied.  One such difference was that the disclosure require-
ments under Section 1502 apply only to those who require conflict minerals for “the functionality 
or production of a product manufactured by such person.”  15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(2)(B) (2012).  The 
proposed CCMA, however, would have applied to persons who engaged in “the commercial explo-
ration, extraction, importation, exportation, or sale of” conflict minerals or use conflict minerals “in 
the manufacture of a product for sale.”  S. 891 § 5.  The changes between the CCMA and Section 
1502 were largely a product of industry lobbying and congressional deal-making to agree to a final 
bill.  According to Senator Feingold, “[Section 1502] was narrowly crafted in consideration of those 
challenges, and it includes waivers and a sunset clause after [five] years” to help properly balance 
the competing concerns.  Feingold Statement, supra note 21, at 8681.  
 30.  S. 891 § 3.   
 31. See, e.g., Tim Worstall, Trump’s Executive Order to Repeal the Worst Law of the Year, 
FORBES (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2017/02/09/trumps-xo-to-repeal-
the-worst-law-of-the-year-section-1502-of-dodd-frank-on-conflict-minerals/#64d06b7147f5 (not-
ing that the “reason the SEC is the enforcer is because [Section 1502] was indeed part of a bill on 
financial regulation”). 
 32.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 1502(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2213 (2010).  Section 13 of the Exchange Act includes the mandated 
disclosure all reporting companies must provide to the SEC.  
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B.  What Section 1502 Requires 
Before addressing the challenge mounted by affected industries and oth-
ers to Section 1502, I will provide first a brief description of what Dodd-
Frank and the attendant SEC rules require.  Section 1502 of Dodd-Frank 
amends Section 13 of the Exchange Act by increasing mandatory disclosure 
requirements for producers of goods that include minerals derived from the 
DRC.33  The law mandates the annual disclosure of the following infor-
mation: whether conflict minerals necessary in the production of a company’s 
manufactured goods “originate in the DRC or an adjoining country.”34 
The term “conflict mineral” is defined as: “(A) columbite-tantalite (col-
tan) [a tantalum ore], cassiterite [a tin ore], gold, wolframite [a tungsten ore], 
or their derivatives; or (B) any other mineral or its derivatives determined by 
the Secretary of State to be financing conflict in the [DRC] or an adjoining 
country.”35  Collectively, these four minerals are often referred to as “3TG”: 
tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold.36 
The process for complying with the law is as follows.  First, a company 
must determine if its products contain one of the four enumerated minerals.37  
If so, the company then must conduct a reasonable country of origin inquiry 
(“RCOI”) to determine the source of the minerals.38  If a company deter-
mines, after conducting an RCOI, that the conflict minerals in use originated 
in the DRC or an adjoining country, the company must submit a report to the 
SEC that includes: (1) a description of the due diligence process undertaken 
by the disclosing party with regard to the source and chain of custody of those 
conflict minerals, which must be independently audited;39 and (2) a descrip-
tion of the products manufactured or contracted to be manufactured that are 
not “DRC conflict free,” the identity of the independent auditor of the source 
and supply chain, the facilities that process the conflict minerals used by the 
disclosing party, the country from which the conflict minerals were obtained, 
and the efforts used to determine the origin (that is, the specific mine) of the 
conflict mineral.40  For a product to be considered “DRC conflict free,” the 
                                                          
 33.  15 U.S.C. § 78m (2012). 
 34.  15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A).  Adjoining countries include Angola, Burundi, Central African 
Republic, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. 
 35.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1502(e)(4). 
 36.  What Are Conflict Minerals?, RESPONSIBLE MINERALS INITIATIVE, http://www.responsi-
blemineralsinitiative.org/about/faq/general-questions/what-are-conflict-minerals/ (last visited Oct. 
3, 2018). 
 37.  15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A). 
 38.  Id. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). 
 39.  15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(i).  This independent audit must be certified by the disclosing 
party, which is an integral part of the due diligence process.  Id.  Additionally, this audit must be 
considered reliable by the SEC.  See id. § 78m(p)(1)(C). 
 40.  Id. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). 
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product must not contain minerals that finance, directly or indirectly, any 
armed groups in the DRC or adjoining countries.41 
The disclosure requirement extends to any individual or company sub-
ject to any of the Exchange Act’s disclosure requirements if such companies 
or individuals require conflict minerals in the production of the products they 
manufacture or contract to be manufactured.42  In addition to making the rel-
evant disclosures to the SEC in a Specialized Disclosure Report, “Form SD,” 
the complying companies also must post the required disclosures on their 
company websites.43 
C.  Legal Challenges to Section 1502 
Although Dodd-Frank was signed into law by President Obama in July 
2010, the SEC rules implementing Section 1502 were not finalized and ef-
fective until November 13, 2012.44  Within two months of the promulgation 
of the finalized SEC rules, the National Association of Manufacturers 
(“NAM”), the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, and 
Business Roundtable challenged the SEC’s final rule.45  The challenge con-
sisted of the following arguments: (1) the SEC failed to meet its statutory 
obligations to consider the effects of the rule; (2) the SEC misinterpreted the 
statute as precluding a de minimus exception; (3) the SEC arbitrarily rejected 
less-costly alternatives; and (4) Section 1502 violated the First Amendment 
because it compelled corporate speech.46  After argument, the District Court 
for the District of Columbia held that each of NAM’s arguments did not rise 
to a compelling legal claim and granted summary judgment in favor of the 
SEC.47  On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in 
2014, the appellants again challenged the conflict minerals rule based on the 
SEC’s alleged failure to consider the effects and costs of the rule to the ex-
clusion of considering less-costly alternatives and reiterated the argument 
that Section 1502 violates the First Amendment.48 
                                                          
 41.  Id. § 78m(p)(1)(D). 
 42.  Id. § 78m(p)(2)(A)–(B). 
 43.  Id. § 78m(p)(1)(E). 
 44.  77 Fed. Reg. 56,362, 56,365 (Sept. 12, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13p–1, 
249b.400 (2013)).  
 45.  Brief for Petitioners at 16–17, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. S.E.C., 956 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.C. Cir. 
2013) (No. 12-1422).  Petitioners first petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia, and the court removed the case to the District Court for the District of Columbia.  Nat’l 
Ass’n of Mfrs. v. S.E.C., 956 F. Supp. 2d 43, 53 (D.D.C. 2013).  Interestingly, this same group of 
petitioners had already challenged a number of provisions in Dodd-Frank and were seemingly 
marching through the massive regulation challenging every possible line of it.  Id.  
 46.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 45, at 16–17. 
 47.  Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 956 F. Supp. 2d at 46.  
 48.  Brief for Appellants at 40, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. S.E.C., 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(No. 13-5252); Reply Brief for Appellants at 28–29, 35, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. S.E.C., 748 F.3d 
359 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (No. 13-5252). 
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Disagreeing with appellants on three of their four arguments in the case, 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the SEC’s conflict 
minerals regulation with one major caveat.49  The court agreed with the ap-
pellants that forcing companies to declare that their products were “not con-
flict free” was tantamount to forcing a company to “confess blood on its 
hands” and, therefore, violated corporate free speech.50  Thus, the court rea-
soned that the mandated language in the SEC regulation was a violation of 
the First Amendment.51  Interestingly, the court did not strike down the entire 
provision but instead allowed the regulation to proceed while carving out the 
mandatory language of “not found to be ‘DRC conflict free.’”52  In other 
words, companies are still required to comply with all of the law as it stands 
but do not have to use the words “not conflict free” when describing their 
products.53 
The SEC, joined by Amnesty International, requested a panel rehearing 
in November 2014, and upon rehearing in August 2015, the D.C. Circuit up-
held its prior ruling in a 2-1 vote.54  The SEC’s October 2015 petition for a 
rehearing en banc was denied.  Finally, in March 2016, then-Attorney Gen-
eral Loretta Lynch issued a letter to Congress stating that the SEC will not be 
seeking a review by the Supreme Court of the United States, leaving in place 
                                                          
 49.  Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. S.E.C., 748 F.3d 359, 366–67, 369, 373 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 50.  Id. at 371.  
 51.  Id. at 371, 373. 
 52.  Id. at 375. 
 53.  See id. at 373 n.14.  The D.C. Circuit assessed which standard applied to compelled cor-
porate speech: A “rational basis” standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985), or the “intermediate 
standard” set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission, 
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).  Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 748 F.3d at 370–71, 72.  The standard for Central 
Hudson requires the government to prove that the compelled corporate speech relates to a substantial 
government interest that is directly advanced by the regulation and that the government regulation 
is narrowly tailored.  Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564, 565.  The D.C. Circuit 
held in the April 2014 conflict minerals decision that the Zauderer standard applied only to cases 
related to consumer deception and, therefore, was not applicable to the conflict minerals disclosure 
rule.  Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 748 F.3d. at 371.  The court further held that the conflict minerals rule 
did not survive the Central Hudson standard because the SEC had no evidence that a less restrictive 
measure would have failed to achieve the stated government interest.  Id. at 372–73.  In an interest-
ing twist in this litigation, the parties resubmitted briefs at the request of the court after the inter-
vening decision in American Meat Institute v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 760 F.3d 18, 20 
(D.C. Cir.), reh’g en banc, 746 F.3d 1065 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. S.E.C., 800 
F.3d 518, 520–21 (D.C. Cir. 2015).  In American Meat Institute, which dealt with compelled country 
of origin disclosures for meat products, the court recognized that Zauderer could apply more 
broadly than mere consumer deception cases and held that forced meat labeling was not a violation 
of the First Amendment.  Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 27.  Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit’s rehearing 
of the conflict minerals provision reaffirmed its original April 2014 holding.  Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 
800 F.3d at 520–21. The court determined in its August 2015 decision that because the conflict 
minerals disclosure is not related to commercial or voluntary advertising, Zauderer did not apply.  
Id. at 522–23. Further, the court reiterated that the SEC did not meet the Central Hudson standard 
either.  Id. at 524. 
 54.  Nat’l of Ass’n of Mfrs. v. S.E.C., 800 F.3d 518, 520–21 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
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the current conflict minerals rule without the mandated “not conflict free” 
language.55 
After years of litigation, the future of the provision remains somewhat 
in question.  The proposed Financial Choice Act of 201756 includes language 
that would not allow the SEC to allocate any funding toward the implemen-
tation of Section 1502.57  Likewise, the Trump Administration made clear 
that it is not a fan of the provision.58  As his first act of signing legislation in 
February 2017, Trump repealed the “sister provision” of Section 1502, Sec-
tion 1504, requiring companies in the extractive industries to disclose any 
payments made to foreign governments.59  Many assumed the conflict min-
erals provision would suffer the same fate.60  It seems, however, that unlike 
enacting legislation that would affirmatively strike down the law, Section 
1502 will proverbially “die on the vine” through lack of enforcement and 
resources. 
Given that the fate of the provision remains in question under the current 
administration, and that it has been in effect for over six years, it is timely to 
take a retrospective look at Section 1502’s effectiveness, as well as its short-
comings, both detailed below. 
II.  THE FAILURE OF HARD LAW IN SECTION 1502 
The crux of this Article turns on the effectiveness and function of “bad” 
or flawed law.  However, before one can assess whether bad law has any 
normative merit, one first must address the fundamental presumption inher-
ent in this Article: The conflict minerals rule was, in fact, bad law.  As I 
referenced in earlier scholarship,61 and expand upon here, Section 1502 was 
a legal disaster, ex ante, for three critical reasons.  First, in terms of securities 
laws, it represented an unmitigated extension of disclosure rules to pursue a 
                                                          
 55.  Letter from Loretta Lynch, Attorney Gen., Office of the Attorney Gen., to Paul Ryan, 
Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (March 4, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-li-
brary/osg-530d-letters/3-4-2016.pdf/download. 
 56.  H.R. 10, 115th Congress (as passed by House, June 8, 2017). 
 57.  Id.; Dynda A. Thomas, Financial CHOICE Act Passes in the House—Would Repeal SEC 
Conflict Minerals Rule, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (June 8, 2017), https://www.conflictminer-
alslaw.com/2017/06/08/financial-choice-act-passes-in-the-house-would-repeal-sec-conflict-miner-
als-rule/. 
 58.  See, e.g., Trump Administration Recommends Dodd-Frank “Conflict Minerals” Disclo-
sure Repeal, ITSCI (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.itsci.org/2017/10/12/trump-administration-recom-
mends-dodd-frank-conflict-minerals-disclosure-repeal/. 
 59.  Roger Yu, Trump Signs Legislation to Scrap Dodd-Frank Rule on Oil Extraction, USA 
TODAY (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/02/14/trump-scraps-dodd-
frank-rule-resource-extraction-disclosure/97912600/. 
 60.  See, e.g., John Filitz, The Dodd-Frank Repeal: What It Means for Conflict Minerals, 
MINING.COM (Aug. 8, 2017), http://www.mining.com/web/dodd-frank-repeal-means-conflict-min-
erals/. 
 61.  See Woody, supra note 13.  
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foreign policy goal.62  Second, the provision was an ineffectual and half-
hearted effort of public international law, leading to global arbitrage in the 
world market for the minerals and a de facto embargo by the United States.63  
Third, the provision was doomed to fail from the rule of law standpoint be-
cause there was no penalty attached to the use of conflict minerals.64  In other 
words, the structure of the law allowed for the continued and unsanctioned 
use of conflict minerals despite its condemnation of that same use.  This Part 
will address each of these three flaws of hard law in turn in order to evaluate, 
in Part III, whether Section 1502 overcame any of these flaws in its applica-
tion. 
A.  Improper Use of Securities Law 
Section 1502 was bad law from the standpoint of securities laws for the 
following reasons: first, the provision requires disclosure of non-material and 
non-financial information; second, it extends the SEC jurisdiction to extra-
territorial firms and conduct.  Both of these reasons point to Section 1502 as 
an improper use of both securities law and the disclosure regime to affect a 
foreign policy goal, which falls well outside of the SEC’s expertise and man-
date. 
1.  Rendering Non-Material Information (to Investors) Material 
The foundation of securities law is housed in its two legislative pillars: 
the Securities Act of 193365 and the Exchange Act.  The disclosure regime 
established in these Acts is intended to be a regulatory mechanism that allows 
for investor protection and accurate valuations of securities.66  Those defend-
ing the disclosure regime of securities law often point out that disclosure reg-
ulations also boost investor confidence and incentivize corporate managers 
to behave more diligently.67 
                                                          
 62.  Id.; see infra Section II.A.; see also Karen E. Woody, Securities Laws as Foreign Policy, 
15 NEV. L.J. 297, 298 (2014) (analyzing three distinct congressional regulations that use securities 
law as a tool of foreign policy: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Section 1502 of Dodd-Frank, 
and Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank).  
 63.  See infra Section II.B.  
 64.  See infra Section II.C. 
 65.  Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa 
(2006)). 
 66.  See generally Michael D. Guttentag, An Argument for Imposing Disclosure Requirements 
on Public Companies, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 123, 133–135 (2004) (noting that benefits of the 
disclosure regime are accurate price valuation and a reduction of agency costs due to informed in-
vestors and managers).   
 67.  See Woody, supra note 13, at 1322 n.34 (citing Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and 
Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regu-
lation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 146 (2006)) (“The emphasis in securities law on providing infor-
mation to the public is premised on the belief that individuals are rational, self-governing actors 
who are willing and able to process the information wisely.  If we assume that investors are rational 
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In general, the disclosure regulations require that companies provide in-
vestors with information regarding the company in order to allow the investor 
to make an informed decision.68  This is defined as material information.69  
The Supreme Court, and the SEC through its disclosure regulations, has 
largely considered material information as that which would have an impact 
on the economic value of an investment.70  Moreover, the audience for the 
disclosed corporate information is investors, not the consuming public.71  In 
other words, the disclosure rules are aimed at Apple’s stockholders, not those 
who merely purchase Apple products.72  In the same vein, the SEC is charged 
with protection of investors, not the American public at large.73 
This critical importance of disclosure in securities law is relevant to the 
critique of Section 1502 because it is hard to argue that the presence of con-
flict minerals in the product of a public company would be considered mate-
rial to investors.74  The SEC rules, while not explicitly adopting an economic 
standard for materiality, implicitly define material information as that which 
bears on the economic value of an investment.75  Indeed, the SEC’s proposed 
rule for Section 1502 stated exactly that point: 
                                                          
risk calculators who are consistently capable of weighing the costs and benefits of risky alternatives 
and selecting the best option, then a system of disclosure makes good sense.”). 
 68.  See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (determining information that 
must be disclosed is that which “would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available”); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 
485 U.S. 224, 230, 231–32 (1988).  
 69.  See TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449; see also Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 231–32.  
 70.  See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social 
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1208–09 (1999); see also BENN STEIL & ROBERT E. 
LITAN, FINANCIAL STATECRAFT: THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL MARKETS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN 
POLICY 64 (2006) (“[T]he SEC assesses materiality on the basis of its relevance to investor financial 
interests.  The SEC’s role is not to advise investors about what is good for them—let alone what 
might be good for the United States—or even to educate investors regarding ethical, religious, or 
foreign policy matters which may attach to doing business overseas.  These matters may well be 
assigned, through appropriate legislation, to other arms of government but ill-suit an agency whose 
reputation for integrity across the globe is intimately bound up with its ability to remain scrupu-
lously neutral in questions as to which businesses do and do not ‘deserve’ private capital.  This 
reputation is critical to America’s ability to attract capital markets activity within its legal jurisdic-
tion.”). 
 71.  “[M]ateriality is . . . ‘about what is important to investors, nothing more and nothing less.’”  
Woody, supra note 13, at 1323 (quoting Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud 
on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 152 (2009)). 
 72.  Karen Woody, Wall Street Watchdog SEC Can’t End Violence in Congo, THE 
CONVERSATION (Dec. 7, 2015, 5:46 AM), https://theconversation.com/wall-street-watchdog-sec-
cant-end-violence-in-congo-51227.  
 73.  See STEIL & LITAN, supra note 70, at 71 (underscoring that the SEC is “chartered to protect 
American investor interests”).  
 74.  See Woody, supra note 13, at 1340–41. 
 75.  See generally Matthew C. Turk & Karen E. Woody, The Leidos Mix-up and the Misunder-
stood Duty to Disclose in Securities Law, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 957, 974 (2018) (outlining the 
role of materiality in securities law and securities fraud cases); see also Williams, supra note 70, at 
1264. 
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It appears that the nature and purpose of the Conflict Minerals Pro-
vision is for the disclosure of certain information to help end the 
emergency humanitarian situation in the eastern DRC that is fi-
nanced by the exploitation and trade of conflict minerals originat-
ing in the DRC countries, which is qualitatively different from the 
nature and purpose of the disclosure of information that has been 
required under the periodic reporting provisions of the Exchange 
Act.76 
Although there has been a recent push to include environmental, social, 
and governance disclosures (“ESG”) in securities filings, there remains a ten-
uous link to financial materiality for such proposals.77  Conflict minerals are 
no different.78 
At the time the SEC’s conflict minerals regulations were passed, then-
SEC Commissioner Daniel Gallagher succinctly stated this position: 
 It is easy to see that the SEC role in this provision is the anomaly.  
That’s because disclosure requirements in the securities laws are 
about telling investors what they reasonably should want to know 
before investing in a company.  The point is to give investors in-
formation that is inherently “material” to their investment deci-
sions.  Disclosure is, and should be, the primary tool for the SEC 
to use in satisfying its mission.  And so it is paramount that we 
focus on getting timely, material disclosures to investors. 
  . . . . 
 Unfortunately, Section 1502 is about curtailing violence in the 
DRC; it is not about investor protection, promoting fair and effi-
cient markets, or capital formation.  Warlords and armed criminals 
                                                          
 76.  Conflict Minerals, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,948, 80,960 (proposed Dec. 23, 2010) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 249) (emphasis added). 
 77.  See Woody, supra note 13, at 1340 & n.168 (citing David Monsma & Timothy Olson, 
Muddling Through Counterfactual Materiality and Divergent Disclosure: The Necessary Search 
for a Duty to Disclose Material Non-Financial Information, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 137, 161, 185, 
196–97 (2007)) (“Monsma and Olson observe, however, that nonfinancial information can be con-
sidered ‘economic’ in sustainable development . . . .  Monsma and Olson argue that socially respon-
sible investor firms consider nonfinancial social responsibility and environmental performance as 
material information for their funds. . . .  Without a clear economic link to the valuation of an in-
vestment, however, the social and environmental information may not rise to the legal definition of 
materiality as espoused by the SEC and the Supreme Court.”). 
 78.  Of course, the rise of socially responsible investing should not be overlooked.  There are 
many who advocate for increased nonfinancial disclosures, or financial disclosures clearly linked 
to corporate social responsibility efforts.  See, e.g., Shlomit Azgad-Tromer, The Virtuous Corpora-
tion: On Corporate Social Motivation and Law, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 341, 353 (2017); Gerlinde 
Berger-Walliser & Inara Scott, Redefining Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Globaliza-
tion and Regulatory Hardening, 55 AM. BUS. L.J. 167, 169, 186, 200 (2018); Eric Engle, What You 
Don’t Know Can Hurt You: Human Rights, Shareholder Activism and SEC Reporting Requirements, 
57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 63, 84–86 (2006); Monsma & Olson, supra note 77, at 161.  
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need to fund their nefarious operations.  Their funding is their life-
line; it’s a chokepoint that should be cut off.  That is a perfectly 
reasonable foreign policy objective.  But it’s not an objective that 
fits anywhere within the SEC’s threefold statutory mission.79 
The importance of materiality being tied to the financial health of an 
investment is also important for proving any corporate misconduct in omit-
ting or mischaracterizing certain information.  Consider, for example, a sce-
nario in which a company files a Form SD and an accompanying conflict 
minerals report that includes a clear misstatement of fact regarding the source 
of the minerals.  Imagine that the company is subsequently sued by a share-
holder or class of shareholders.  The materiality question that would be par-
amount to the analysis of such a securities case is whether the shareholder 
could prove loss or loss causation.80  This element of a securities claim is 
typically proven retrospectively by evaluating the change in stock price when 
the issuer makes various announcements, such as the corrective disclosure.81 
This retrospective lens also makes sense when considering the standing 
of injured investors in such a suit.  That is, investors are not bringing securi-
ties claims in cases where the information omitted did not cause them an in-
jury in the form of lost profits.82  It seems highly unlikely that an omission or 
misstatement regarding conflict minerals would drastically move a com-
pany’s share price, “thus proving the immateriality of the information.”83  
That is, if Boeing was in fact unable to locate the source of the gold in its 
wiring but, nevertheless, declared in its Form SD that its planes do not con-
tain minerals from the DRC, it would be a stretch to imagine that such a mis-
statement and subsequent corrective statement would drastically move the 
stock price of Boeing, if at all. 
The use of non-financial corporate disclosures to promote and require 
corporate social responsibility has been debated in much of the securities law 
and CSR literature for a number of years.84  Indeed, the use of disclosure 
                                                          
 79.  Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at SEC Open Meeting: 
Proposed Rule to Implement Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act—the “Conflict Minerals” Provi-
sion (Aug. 22, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/2012-08-22-open-meeting-state-
ment-dmg [hereinafter Statement of Commissioner Gallagher]. The threefold mission of the SEC is 
to facilitate capital formation, maintain fair, orderly markets, and to protect investors.  See Daniel 
M. Gallagher, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, A Renewed Focus on SEC Priorities, Speech at 
AICPA/SIFMA Financial Management Society Conference on the Securities Industry (Oct. 25, 
2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2013-spch102513dmg. 
 80.  See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Rethinking Basic, 69 BUS. LAW. 671, 692–96 
(2014) (defining loss causation as the attribution of economic losses to the dissipation of fraudulent 
distortion resulting from a corrective disclosure).  
 81.  See generally Jon Koslow, Estimating Aggregate Damages in Class-Action Litigation Un-
der Rule 10b-5 for Purposes of Settlement, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 811 (1991). 
 82.  Id.  
 83.  See Woody, supra note 13, at 1341. 
 84.  See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 59 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 788 (2002).  
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requirements seems to be a preferred legislative tool, certainly in Dodd-Frank 
and elsewhere.  Dodd-Frank, in particular, required disclosures about mine 
safety, extractive industry payments, and conflict minerals.  Other legislation, 
including the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”),85 re-
quires climate and environmental disclosures.86  Other required disclosures, 
for example, are related to cybersecurity, sustainability, corporate business 
in Iran and Syria, and other non-financial topics.87 
The use of non-financial, and arguably non-material, mandated disclo-
sures can result in information overload and stray beyond the goal of investor 
protection.88  This dilutes the importance of material information and 
stretches thin the resources of the SEC, which is tasked with ensuring ade-
quate and verified information.89 
2.  Indirect Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
The second reason that Section 1502 raises alarms from a securities law 
standpoint is the expansion of expertise and jurisdiction of the SEC as pri-
mary regulator.  This situation likely could have been avoided by more care-
ful crafting of the legislation.  In attempting to curb violence in the DRC—
the stated aim of Section 1502—Congress could have asserted more direct 
extraterritorial jurisdiction and banned all companies, domestic or foreign, 
from selling any product in the United States that contained conflict minerals.  
In the case of Section 1502, however, Congress chose a more indirect ap-
proach to meet its extraterritorial goals.90 
Section 1502 does not create extraterritorial jurisdiction for the SEC 
over foreign firms, per se, but it does create indirect extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion.  Here’s why: Foreign firms not registered on an American exchange, 
and, therefore, not subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC, may be forced to 
comply with the provision because they are part of a supply chain in which 
the final product is manufactured by an issuing company subject to SEC ju-
risdiction.  Although outside of the reach of any SEC disclosure requirement 
or liability scheme, a foreign company may feel the pressure from an issuing 
company to have an entire supply chain in compliance with Section 1502, 
which may result in foreign companies rising to meet the standard required 
by the provision despite the lack of any similar requirements in their home 
                                                          
 85.  Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 86.  Id.  
 87.  See generally Roberta S. Karmel, Disclosure Reform—The SEC Is Riding Off in Two Di-
rections at Once, 71 BUS. LAW. 781 (2016).  
 88.  Id.  
 89.  Id.  
 90.  See CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE MAKING 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 37–39 (2012) (dissecting the intersection of territoriality and financial state-
craft and offering a number of examples of direct extraterritorial jurisdiction of foreign firms or 
foreign conduct by firms falling within American jurisdiction). 
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jurisdiction.91  In other words, the SEC is indirectly monitoring non-U.S. 
companies that are involved in the supply chains of companies under SEC 
jurisdiction.  This indirect expansion of SEC jurisdiction cuts against the pur-
pose and scope of the agency.92 
B.  Failed Public International Law 
The second, and arguably most important, failure of Section 1502 is how 
far it missed its mark from its well-intended goals.  The failure of Section 
1502 as a public international measure is distressing and should force legis-
lators to consider how to effectively tackle violence in the DRC.  Instead, 
Section 1502 instituted a de facto embargo, thereby hurting the people of the 
DRC more than it helped.  In addition, the de facto embargo did not change 
the international and black markets for minerals, thereby failing to make a 
dent in the supply and demand of the illicit products.  Finally, Section 1502 
represents a failure in public international law because it was enacted at the 
expense of better, more thought-out legislation.  That is, the opportunity cost 
of not doing something more effective was overlooked.  This Section ad-
dresses each of these issues in turn. 
1.  De Facto Embargo 
As was widely reported in news outlets within twenty-four hours of the 
passage of Dodd-Frank, the implementation of Section 1502 led to a de facto 
embargo on formal trade.93  This concern was raised during the Congres-
sional discussion surrounding Dodd-Frank: Senator Feingold addressed the 
issue in his statement to the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
Committee, wherein he reiterated that the goal of the legislation is not to shut 
down the mineral trade, but to support a conflict-free mining economy that 
                                                          
 91.  The issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the SEC is not remedied when other jurisdic-
tions enact similar legislation, despite the fact that copycat legislation in other jurisdictions would 
increase the legitimacy of the conflict minerals legislation.  Interestingly, Section 1502 is not unique 
in that it allowed for the SEC to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction in enforcing domestic law.  See 
Woody, supra note 13, at 1342.  The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-
1–dd-3 (2012), passed in 1977, allows the SEC to investigate foreign payments and illegal bribery 
occurring abroad.  Id.  Yet, the FCPA is more closely related to the goals of the SEC because its 
goal involves corporate transparency in books and records.  This is significantly distinguishable 
from the extraterritorial reach and goal of Section 1502, which is aimed at reducing violence in the 
DRC, and is, therefore, a foreign policy, rather than a securities law, goal.  But see Barbara Black, 
The SEC and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Fighting Global Corruption Is Not Part of the 
SEC’s Mission, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1093, 1111–12, 1116–17 (2012) (arguing that the FCPA is not 
within the congressional mandate of the SEC). 
 92.  See Section II.C.2 and accompanying notes.  
 93.  Rick Paulus, How the Conflict Minerals Rule Failed, PAC. STANDARD (Aug. 3, 2017), 
https://psmag.com/economics/how-the-conflict-minerals-rule-failed. 
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benefits the Congolese people.94  Nevertheless, Congolese activists and oth-
ers continually asserted that this regulation will lead, and has already led, to 
an embargo of Congolese minerals, resulting in a drastic cost that would out-
weigh any purported benefits of the regulation.95  The de facto embargo was 
not merely an academic theory; upon passage of Dodd-Frank, the DRC felt 
the impact of this legislation nearly immediately.  The effects of the de facto 
embargo and the attendant international black market for minerals are dis-
cussed in Part III. 
2.  Opportunity Cost 
Section 1502 is a legislative failure in terms of public international law 
because it took away the opportunity for Congress to do something better for 
the people of the DRC, who continue to experience a humanitarian crisis.  
The atrocities occurring in the DRC are real; they are pervasive; and they 
need to be addressed with the best possible solutions for increased peace in 
the region.  Creating a disclosure regulation for U.S. public companies did 
not take on the full market for conflict minerals, nor did it make the DRC 
safer.  While these ramifications in themselves are sufficient to deem Section 
1502 a failure of public international law, one must additionally consider the 
opportunity cost of not creating a diplomatic solution. 
This is not to say, of course, that diplomatic solutions could not be de-
ployed in addition to Section 1502.  Indeed, many defenders of Section 1502, 
particularly the active non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”), such as 
the Enough Project and Global Witness, point out that there may not be a 
silver bullet diplomatic solution; thus, we should try every possible method 
to help the DRC.96  The counterpoint to that argument is that the administra-
tive state, comprised of agencies with specialized expertise, is most effective 
when used properly.97  As argued below, the SEC is not the agency to handle 
humanitarian crises abroad and should not be deployed to do so.98  When 
                                                          
 94.  155 CONG. REC. 10599 (2009) (statement of Sen. Feingold); see Statement of Commis-
sioner Gallagher, supra note 79; Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement 
at Open Meeting to Adopt a Final Rule Regarding Conflict Minerals Pursuant to Section 1502 of 
the Dodd-Frank Act (Aug. 22, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/2012-08-22-
open-meeting-statement-tap. 
 95.  See, e.g., David Aronson, How Congress Devastated Congo, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2011, at 
A19; see also Hans Bader, Thousands of Jobs and Billions in Wealth Wiped out by Dodd-Frank 
Conflict Minerals Provision, OPEN MARKET (July 27, 2011), http://www.openmar-
ket.org/2011/07/27/thousands-of-jobs-and-billions-in-wealth-wiped-out-by-dodd-frank-conflict-
minerals-provision/. 
 96.  See, e.g., GLOBAL WITNESS, PUTTING PRINCIPLES INTO PRACTICE: RISKS AND 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONFLICT-FREE SOURCING IN EASTERN CONGO (2013), https://www.global-
witness.org/en/campaigns/democratic-republic-congo/putting-principles-practice/.   
 97.  See generally Woody, supra note 62 (arguing that there are varying degrees of institutional 
harm when agencies are not used for their specialized expertise within the administrative state).  
 98.  See infra Section II.C.2 and accompanying notes.  
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Section 1502 placed the responsibility of reducing violence in the DRC es-
sentially within the jurisdiction of the SEC, the world lost an opportunity for 
a better solution with proper experts taking the helm.  Yet, there likely is both 
fatigue by lawmakers from continuing to discuss other options for the DRC, 
as well as a sense that they have already come up with a solution to the prob-
lem and, therefore, do not want to consider other alternatives. 
C.  Ineffective Legal Structure 
The third category in which Section 1502 can be considered bad law is 
in the structure of the legislation itself.  This Section analyzes the penalty-
less structure of the provision, as well as its enforcement mechanism, to point 
out additional critical flaws with the law. 
1.  Name and Shame: Laws Without Penalty 
Shockingly, Section 1502 was designed to minimize its effect on the 
global market for 3TG because of the lack of any penalty or sanction included 
therein.99  This provision has no penalty attached to the continued use of con-
flict minerals.  That is, the legislation does not punish companies for contin-
uing to engage in the activity that the legislation is attempting to eradicate.  
As merely a “name and shame” provision, the drafters ostensibly hoped to 
rely on public consciousness to drive market pressures that would, in turn, 
alter corporate behavior.100  In other words, the efficacy of the provision turns 
on the public behavior, and modification of that behavior, upon learning that 
certain corporations have products that contain conflict minerals.  In order to 
accomplish this, consumers and the public at large, rather than simply inves-
tors, will need to be apprised of the conflict mineral reports of various com-
panies.101  Of course, this is demanding a fair amount from mere consumers: 
first, research and information gathering; second, even if the consumer is 
aware of the information, the consumer needs to be motivated enough to 
modify his or her buying habits. 
Absent this consumer action, there is no sanction related to conflict min-
erals.  For instance, in a situation in which a company has disclosed that it 
uses conflict minerals, the SEC obviously plays no role because the company 
has complied with regulatory standards by the disclosure.  In other words, a 
                                                          
 99.  Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 573, 626 (2008) (“When lawmaking authorities create laws that by their own terms 
or common understanding have no effect, one immediately suspects a cynical public-relations 
ploy.”). 
 100.  See generally Kish Parella, Reputational Regulation, 67 DUKE L.J. 907 (2018) (discussing 
the efficacy of boycotts and other reputational sanctions upon companies).  
 101.  See Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: To-
ward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 146 (2006) 
(“In order for a disclosure system to be effective, not only must the information that is supplied be 
disclosed completely . . . but it must also be read and comprehended by the consumer.”).   
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company can file a Form SD with the SEC, publish the Form SD on its web-
site, and hope that there is no resultant public backlash for the conflict min-
erals usage.  From a public international law standpoint, it would seem that 
the possibility of a remorseless, albeit SEC-compliant, company reduces the 
law to a toothless tiger.102 
2.  Lack of Regulatory Agency Expertise 
Another indication of the ineffective structure of Section 1502 is the 
inappropriateness of the agency charged with enacting the provision.  The 
SEC has a three-part mandate: (1) protect investors; (2) maintain fair, orderly, 
and efficient markets; and (3) facilitate capital formation.103  In other words, 
the primary aim of the agency is the preservation of market integrity.104  The 
method for ensuring that the first two parts of the mandate, investor protec-
tion and assurance of fair markets, are met “lies in market transparency and 
is achieved through disclosure of material information to investors.”105  As 
stated by the SEC, “Only through the steady flow of timely, comprehensive, 
and accurate information can people make sound investment decisions.”106  
The SEC is not charged with foreign policy regulations or goals, nor is the 
agency equipped with the expertise or the resources to take on a regulation 
that has a goal of reducing violence in the DRC. 
Moreover, just as there exists an opportunity cost when considering 
what other methods were not employed to help the DRC,107 there also is the 
opportunity cost to the SEC.  That is, the SEC spends some of its finite re-
sources and time working on the regulations, litigating the SEC rule, and re-
viewing Form SDs, to no real effect.108  This is an inefficient and improper 
use of an agency tasked with investor protection, market fairness, and capital 
formation. 
III.  MEASURING THE SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF SECTION 1502 
Having arrived at the point wherein I hope to have established the pre-
sumption that Section 1502 was a failure of hard law ab initio, this Article 
turns to an assessment about the positive and normative effects of Section 
                                                          
 102.  See, e.g., Jeff Schwartz, The Conflict Minerals Experiment, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 129, 
161–67 (2016).  
 103.  About the SEC, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about.shtml (last updated 
May 21, 2018). 
 104.  See, e.g., Woody, supra note 13, at 1320.  
 105.  Id. 
 106.  What We Do, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html (last 
updated June 10, 2013). 
 107.  See supra Section II.B.3 and accompanying notes.  
 108.  See, e.g., Woody, supra note 62, at 318 (discussing the institutional harm incurred by re-
quiring the SEC to take on the tasks related to conflict mineral disclosure).  
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1502.  The only true metric for success, by design of Section 1502, was the 
reduction of violence in the DRC.109  However, other potential measures of 
success should be considered, given that Section 1502 is entirely a “name and 
shame” provision.  That is, the true measure of the provision’s effectiveness 
should come in the form of increased consumer awareness of conflict miner-
als and increased corporate awareness of supply chains surrounding conflict 
minerals.  In addition, copycat provisions in other jurisdictions such as the 
European Union (“EU”) suggest that Section 1502, possibly, was the rock 
that caused some international ripples.  This Part details the effect the provi-
sion had on the people of the DRC, as well as its effect internationally.  In 
particular, this Section considers the diverse normative effects of Section 
1502 felt domestically and internationally. 
A.  Effect on the DRC 
Since the passage of Dodd-Frank, major American corporations shied 
away from using Congolese minerals.110  As a result, certain mines in the 
DRC suspended operations, forcing many Congolese out of work.111  As 
early as 2011, before the SEC even finalized its regulations for Section 1502, 
exports of the “3T”—tin, tantalum, and tungsten—from the DRC fell by sev-
enty percent since the previous summer, a phenomenon that the local miners 
referred to as “Obama’s embargo.”112 
Of course, going hand-in-hand with economic embargoes is market and 
regulatory arbitrage.113  Companies incorporated in other countries, or com-
panies without reporting requirements with the SEC, are able to take ad-
vantage of the de facto embargo.114  China, for example, capitalized on the 
stringent U.S. regulation as early as 2011 and now seems to possess a virtual 
monopoly on the Congolese minerals.115  A Congolese civil society member 
stated: 
                                                          
 109.  See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 1502(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2213 (2010).  
 110.  Mary Kay Magistad, Slideshow: Why Chinese Mineral Buyers Are Eying Congo, PRI’S 
THE WORLD (Oct. 26, 2011, 11:40 AM), http://www.theworld.org/2011/10/chinese-conflict-miner-
als-congo. 
 111.  Id.  
 112.  Editorial, Africa and “Obama’s Embargo”, WALL ST. J. (July 18, 2011), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703956604576109773538681918; see also Par-
ker & Vadheim, supra note 14, at 2.  
 113.  See generally Harald Baum, Globalizing Capital Markets and Possible Regulatory Re-
sponses, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF GLOBALIZATION: CONFLICT OF LAWS, INTERNET, CAPITAL 
MARKETS AND INSOLVENCY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 77, 86 (Jurgen Basedow & Toshiyuki Kono 
eds., 2000).  
 114.  See Remi Moncel, Cooperating Alone: The Global Reach of U.S. Regulations on Conflict 
Minerals, 34 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 216, 216 (2016).  
 115.  Magistad, supra note 110 (quoting Jason Luneno Maene, Congolese civil society leader). 
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[The Chinese mineral buyers] are paying [twenty] percent less, 
maybe even [thirty] percent less than the old price, because now 
they are the only buyers . . . .  The lower price means fewer people 
are bringing minerals to sell, and a lot of mines have suspended 
operations.  But the Chinese are buying what comes to them.  Their 
warehouses are full, with constant turnover.116 
In addition, there has been an increase in the exportation and mining of 
gold, in particular, from the DRC since the implementation of Section 
1502.117  Scholars suggest that the reason for this is that “approximately 
[ninety-eight percent] of gold mined in the eastern DRC is smuggled” and 
that much of the gold from the DRC supply markets that are not regulated by 
Dodd-Frank, such as the Middle East and Asia.118  Even for companies that 
do fall under the ambit of Dodd-Frank, gold is particularly difficult to trace 
and regulators have essentially “exempted” gold for this reason.119 
Moreover, the de facto embargo did nothing to reduce the violence in 
the region and, some scholars have argued, rendered the region more vola-
tile.120  In a study published in 2016, Professor Dominic Parker and Bryan 
Vadheim embarked upon an empirical study of violence in the DRC since the 
passage of Dodd-Frank.121  The study found the probability of violence 
against civilians, post-Dodd-Frank, increased significantly.122  The study 
concluded that Dodd-Frank caused increases in violence against civilians be-
cause it generated incentives for militia to loot: “Instead of reducing violence, 
the evidence indicates the [Dodd-Frank] policy increased the likelihood that 
armed groups looted civilians and committed violence against them.”123 
Another study by Professor Parker, published in 2016, addressed the 
secondary effect of the de facto economic sanction imposed by Dodd-Frank 
on the DRC.124  In that study, the authors concluded that the impact of Dodd-
Frank upon villages near the mines that U.S. companies boycotted was that 
                                                          
 116.  Id.  
 117.  Parker & Vadheim, supra note 14, at 11. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id.  Parker and Vadheim point out that gold is relatively easy to smelt and, therefore, easy 
to comingle with gold from different mines, making tracing a difficult endeavor.  
 120.  Laura Seay, Congo Conflict Minerals Bill Hurts the Miners It Hopes to Help, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR (July 18, 2011), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Moni-
tor/2011/0718/Congo-conflict-minerals-bill-hurts-the-miners-it-hopes-to-help (“[C]utting off de-
mand for Congolese minerals on international markets does absolutely nothing to stop violence 
against civilians and only makes life for many civilians worse by leaving them with no viable means 
of financially supporting themselves or their families.”). 
 121.  Parker & Vadheim, supra note 14, at 1.  
 122.  Id. at 41.  
 123.  Id. at 41, 44.  
 124.  Dominic P. Parker et al., Unintended Consequences of Sanctions for Human Rights: Con-
flict Minerals and Infant Mortality, 59 J.L. & ECON. 731, 731 (2016). 
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infant deaths increased by 143%.125  That is, the infant mortality rate sky-
rocketed as a result of these communities losing their source of revenue from 
the mines.126  The study suggested that the loss of income streams is one 
reason for the uptick in infant mortality and so too is the likely disruption to 
maternal health facilities and care.127  Finally, the authors concluded that 
Dodd-Frank might have actually increased the armed conflict, which has ob-
vious ramifications upon infant mortality.128 
A New York Times op-ed published prior to the Parker study included 
similar comments from someone who had first-hand knowledge of the effects 
of Section 1502 on the people of the DRC: 
 The pastor at one church told me that women were giving birth 
at home because they couldn’t afford the $20 or so for the mater-
nity clinic.  Children are dropping out of school because parents 
can’t pay the fees [without the few dollars a day they once had 
working at the mines].  Remote mining towns are virtually cut off 
from the outside world because the planes that once provisioned 
them no longer land.129 
The empirical studies and stories from those in the DRC paint the pic-
ture that Section 1502 has not reduced violence in the country and, instead, 
has had other deleterious effects in the region.  Moreover, the mineral trade 
seems to be alive and well, given the unilateral action by only the United 
States.130  Thus, the metrics for success as defined in the provision as the 
reduction of violence in the DRC show a resounding failure of the law.  
Whether there have been normative shifts in behavior is a broader metric that 
must be considered and is analyzed below. 
B.  Effect on U.S. Corporate Awareness and Compliance 
One of the few quantitative measurements of the effectiveness of Sec-
tion 1502 is the number of companies who actually filed Form SDs.  While 
a number of companies performed due diligence on their supply chains, the 
overwhelming discovery, by both the Government Accountability Office 
(“GAO”) and companies themselves, was that tracing conflict minerals is a 
near-impossible task.131 
                                                          
 125.  Id.  
 126.  Id. at 733.  
 127.  Id.  
 128.  Id.  
 129.  Aronson, supra note 95; see also Brandon Bailey, Gunmen Still Control Metals Mined for 
Modern Gadgets, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 25, 2016), https://ap-
news.com/17c21d0416a54acfbd2b6b842b68858d.  
 130.  See Seay, supra note 120.  
 131.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-561, SEC CONFLICT MINERALS RULE: 
INITIAL DISCLOSURES INDICATE MOST COMPANIES WERE UNABLE TO DETERMINE THE SOURCE 
OF THEIR CONFLICT MINERALS 18 (2015). 
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In its August 2015 report, the GAO assessed whether companies were 
able to comply with the SEC regulations related to Section 1502.132  After the 
SEC promulgated its final regulations in 2012, there was a two-year window 
in which most companies were able to declare their products “DRC conflict 
undeterminable” per the regulation.133  Thus, 2014 was the first year a full 
audit of Form SDs could be conducted.  The GAO found that the 2014 filings 
were fewer than the SEC had estimated and “provide[d] limited insights re-
garding country of origin and chain of custody.”134  In total, only 1321 com-
panies filed Form SDs in 2014, which was substantially lower than the SEC’s 
estimate of over 6000 companies that would be affected and required to 
file.135  Of those filings, sixty-seven percent of filers were unable to deter-
mine the country of origin of the minerals.136 
The filings for years 2015 and 2016 indicated similar rates of filings and 
similar inability to locate the source of the minerals by the companies per-
forming due diligence.  In 2015, 1281 companies filed Form SDs; in 2016, 
the number was 1230.137  The GAO stated that an estimated fifty-five percent 
of companies reporting in 2016 could not definitively confirm the source of 
the minerals in their products.138  As in the two previous years, almost all of 
the companies that reported could not determine whether the minerals fi-
nanced or benefited armed groups, as required by Section 1502.139 
                                                          
 132.  Id. at 2. 
 133.  Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,281 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 240, 249, 249b). 
 134.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 131, at 11 (emphasis omitted).  
 135.  Id. at 13.  
 136.  Id. at 15.  
 137.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-517R, SEC CONFLICT MINERALS RULE: 
2017 REVIEW OF COMPANY DISCLOSURES IN RESPONSE TO THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION RULE 3 (2017).  One potential reason for the low return rate on Form SDs could have 
been that companies were waiting to know what the state of the law would be after the litigation.  
However, the litigation did not include a stay, so companies were still required to file their forms.  
The lack of responses shows that the SEC does not have much leeway when dealing with obstinate 
companies because the filing is only required if companies actually have conflict minerals in their 
products.  That is, Form SD is not a required filing for every public company.  The GAO report of 
2017 notes, however, that SEC officials posited that the low number of filings could be a result of 
mergers among companies.  Id. at 3–4.  
 138.  Id. at 7. 
 139.  Id.; see also Yong H. Kim & Gerald F. Davis, 80% of Companies Don’t Know if Their 
Products Contain Conflict Minerals, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 4, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/01/80-
of-companies-dont-know-if-their-products-contain-conflict-minerals.  
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TABLE 1 
Year Number of Filings Conflict Mineral 
Reports140 
Source of Minerals 
Undeterminable 
2014 1321141 1020142 77%143 
2015 1281144 1013145 67%146 
2016 1230147 985148 55%149 
2017 1153150 911151 63%152 
 
On the whole, it seems Section 1502 did not make any major waves in 
terms of radical corporate response or robust efforts into transparent supply 
chains, given the small number of companies that undertook the exercise.  
Nevertheless, the corporate disclosure requirement certainly made many 
companies learn about the DRC, undertake some effort at supply chain trans-
parency, and work to set up compliance measures for Section 1502.  In that 
sense, corporate awareness seemingly increased, albeit minimally, regarding 
conflict minerals and the plight of the DRC. 
C.  Effect on Consumer Awareness 
In addition to increased corporate awareness of conflict minerals 
through the disclosure requirement, the success of Section 1502 rises and 
falls upon consumer awareness.  Because Section 1502 is a “name and 
shame” bill, the drafters must have assumed that consumers will boycott 
products and companies that use and trade in conflict minerals.  For the pro-
vision to have proverbially moved the needle on consumer awareness, we 
                                                          
 140.  As noted above in Part I, conflict mineral reports are required once a company has per-
formed a reasonable country of origin inquiry and found that the minerals likely originated from the 
DRC or neighboring country, then the company must undergo additional due diligence and file a 
conflict mineral report (CMR).  
 141.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 131, at 11. 
 142.  Schwartz, supra note 102, at 144. 
 143.  Id. at 156–57.  
 144.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 137, at 7. 
 145.  DEV. INT’L, DODD-FRANK SECTION 1502—RY2016 FILING EVALUATION 23 (2017). 
 146.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 137, at 7. 
 147.  Id.  
 148.  DEV. INT’L, supra note 145, at 3. 
 149.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 137, at 7 
 150.  DEV. INT’L, supra note 145, at 3. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. at 33; Conflict Minerals Reporting. A Snapshot of the 2017 SEC Filings, SOURCE 
INTELLIGENCE, https://www.sourceintelligence.com/conflict-minerals-reporting-a-snapshot-of-
the-2017-sec-filings/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2018). 
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must look at the buying trends of consumers.  While empirical data is scant 
on this point,153 another potential measure is simply public awareness and 
consciousness, which hopefully drives corporate conduct.154 
This certainly proved true in the early stages of Dodd-Frank.  For exam-
ple, some companies were accused of lobbying to undercut the utility of Sec-
tion 1502 and were met with backlash.  Intel, later heralded for being one of 
the first movers on supply chain due diligence for conflict minerals, was spe-
cifically targeted early on for the way in which it handled its stance on this 
legislation and was forced to analyze its supply chain.155 As a result of the 
litigation related to Section 1502 and promotion by companies who have at-
tempted to comply with the provision, consumer awareness of conflict min-
erals likely has increased.156  This has been aided by celebrity activists such 
as Robin Wright and Ben Affleck, who have been visible in lobbying Con-
gress on the issue of conflict minerals and writing op-eds outlining their 
views in favor of conflict mineral regulation.157  Similarly, the Enough Pro-
ject, headed by John Prendergast, is one of the foremost NGOs tackling con-
flict mineral issues and often uses celebrities to assist with increasing aware-
ness on conflict minerals.158 
                                                          
 153.  An in-depth empirical survey analyzing the consumer trends since the passage of Section 
1502 will be the focus of my future scholarship but the data are not yet available.  
 154.  See Monsma & Olson, supra note 77, at 184 (“Brand reputation, among other business 
incentives, drives companies to manage areas that lie beyond regulatory compliance and tangible 
financial relevance.”). 
 155.  For example, Intel initially deleted comments on its Facebook page made by activists that 
were critical of its stance on the conflict mineral legislation.  After reposting the comments, Intel 
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address this problem.  
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Issue (May 19, 2010), https://blogs.intel.com/csr/2010/05/intels_statement_on_conflict_m/. 
 156.  See, e.g., Univ. of Sussex, Industry Collaboration, Consumer Pressure Key to Stopping 
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of my future scholarship. 
 157.  Ben Affleck, Editorial, The Deadliest War, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/29/AR2010112905964.html; 
Carol Shih, Robin Wright’s Mission to End Conflict Minerals, THE LILY (Nov. 16, 2017), 
https://www.thelily.com/robin-wrights-mission-to-end-conflict-minerals-2/; Robin Wright, From 
Dragon Tattoo to Congo: Combatting the Scourge of Violence Against Women, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Jan. 10, 2012, 2:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robin/from-dragon-tattoo-to-
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 158.  See, e.g., Ryan Gosling & John Prendergast, Congo’s Conflict Minerals: The Next Blood 
Diamonds, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 27, 2011), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/ryan-gosling/con-
gos-conflict-minerals-_b_854023.html. 
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D.  Imitation as the Sincerest Form of Flattery: Similar Legislation in 
Other Jurisdictions 
Proponents of Section 1502 may argue that, like the promulgation and 
enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”),159 which led to 
the implementation of similar legislation in other countries, Section 1502 set 
the high standard that other countries are now trying to meet.160  Indeed, this 
argument has some validity given that the EU passed its own conflict miner-
als provision just this year, and one U.S. state enacted similar legislation. 
1.  The Europeran Union 
One of the biggest “successes” that can be attributed to Section 1502 is 
the fact that in May 2017, the EU adopted a new import regulation regarding 
conflict minerals.161  The EU regulation goes into effect in January 2021162 
and requires all importers of 3TG to conduct due diligence on their supply 
chains.163  The EU regulation is broader than Section 1502 in that it is not 
limited to public companies with end products that contain conflict miner-
als.164  Instead, the regulation is situated lower down in the supply chain and 
applies to all importers of the minerals.  In addition, the EU regulation is not 
directed only at minerals derived from DRC but includes minerals from other 
conflict-affected or high-risk areas.165 
In order to comply with the EU Directive, importers of minerals to the 
EU must follow a five-step process: (1) establish a strong company manage-
ment system for tracing minerals; (2) identify and assess risks within their 
supply chains; (3) design and implement a compliance strategy to respond to 
                                                          
 159.  15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–78dd-3 (2012). 
 160.  See Woody, supra note 13, at 1347 (noting that the FCPA served as an example of the 
United States enacting legislation that other countries eventually adopted in similar form); see also 
Moncel, supra note 114, at 231–43 (detailing the literature on unilateral regulatory globalization 
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eventually matched by other jurisdictions).  
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Frank Act in the U.S., DELOITTE (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www2.deloitte.com/be/en/pages/tax/arti-
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 162.  Council Regulation 2017/821 of May 17, 2017, Laying Down Supply Chain Due Diligence 
Obligations for Union Importers of Tin, Tantalum and Tungsten, Their Ores, and Gold Originating 
from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, 2017 O.J. (L 130) 1, 16 (EU).  
 163.  Id. at 5, art. 1. 
 164.  Id.  
 165.  Id. 
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the identified risks; (4) engage in an independent third-party audit of the sup-
ply chain due diligence; and (5) create an annual report on the supply chain 
due diligence.166 
2.  California 
In 2011, California became the first U.S. state to adopt legislation re-
garding conflict minerals.167  The California law contains similar language to 
that of Section 1502 of Dodd-Frank168 and mandates that a company may not 
bid or submit a proposal for a contract with a state agency without complying 
with Section 1502.169  Importantly, the California legislation is conditioned 
upon Section 1502; that is, the California law requires that any company that 
bids for a contract with the state of California must be in compliance with 
Section 1502.  Accordingly, if Section 1502 is repealed, or even not enforced 
by the SEC, the California provision also is rendered meaningless. 
IV.  LESSONS FROM THE SECTION 1502 EXPERIMENT: THE SOFTENING OF 
HARD LAW 
As detailed above, Section 1502 can be understood as a hard law failure 
in many respects but provides important lessons for future legislative efforts 
in both securities law and public international law.  This Part addresses the 
major lesson of Section 1502: The failure of Section 1502 as hard law sets 
up the imperative of soft law, or normative shifts, to accomplish the goals set 
out by the hard law.  In other words, the phenomenon of Section 1502 is, in 
essence, the softening of hard law. 
A.  The Dichotomy of Hard and Soft Law 
As described above, hard law is defined as the binding, codified law.170  
Soft law, on the other hand, consists of guiding principles or standards, often 
manifested in customs or normative behavioral constructs.171  Soft law is of-
ten defined in terms of being the lack of hard law.172  Soft law “is widely used 
                                                          
 166.  See Lone Wandahl Mouyal & Per Vestergaard Pedersen, New E.U. Regulation on Conflict 
Minerals, DLA PIPER (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/denmark/insights/publica-
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as a concept to denote all normative instruments that do not amount to classic 
‘hard law.’”173  The literature on hard law and soft law is typically housed 
within the international relations canon.174  This is the most logical home for 
the literature, given the lack of global jurisdiction for any particular hard law; 
thus, the role of soft law in international regulation is critical. 
The majority of the literature on hard law and soft law considers the 
ossification of soft law; that is, soft law that can be turned into hard law 
through legal codification of standards or norms.175  For example, an interna-
tional body such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (“OECD”) or the International Organization of Securities Commis-
sions (“IOSCO”) may pass non-binding soft law principles.  When the soft 
law principles set forth by the international organizations are implemented 
into binding domestic law, soft law is thereby “hardened.”176  One of the 
clearest examples of this is the anti-bribery efforts put forth by the OECD 
that have been codified into a number of domestic regulations across the 
globe.177  The hard law corollaries promulgated in the wake of the soft law 
of the OECD guidelines include the FCPA and the U.K. Bribery Act of 
2010.178 
In somewhat of a nuanced difference from the other literature discussing 
hard law and soft law, in this Article, I employ the dichotomy of hard law 
versus soft law in the domestic, rather than international, sense.  The purpose 
of this domestic lens is to underscore that the domestic, codified hard law of 
Section 1502 is toothless and ineffectual, given that it does not include any 
penalty scheme.179  As such, the only metric for its success lies in the arena 
of soft law and normative effects.  Thus, as noted above, Section 1502 repre-
sents the example of the softening of hard law, a phenomenon that begs ex-
ploration and analysis. 
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B.  The Imperative of Soft Law Solutions 
As detailed in Part II, the structure of Section 1502 essentially sets it out 
as a soft law initiative disguised as hard law.  There is no penalty for using 
conflict minerals; the only measure of changing corporate behavior is going 
to be through the pressure of naming and shaming that arises from consum-
ers, NGOs, or others.180  In this way, one can argue that the more press that 
Section 1502 can receive, the more successful it will be, even if that press is 
about its failure.  In other words, the axiom that “all press is good press” is 
apt in this situation. Increased public consciousness and shifting public and 
corporate behavior is the best outcome of Section 1502. 
Indeed, there already exists a fair amount of soft law related to conflict 
minerals. As early as 2003, the UN highlighted the illegal exploitation of the 
DRC and urged foreign buyers of minerals to review their supply chains.181  
Likewise, the OECD has issued guidance for due diligence related to supply 
chains.182  The OECD framework for due diligence includes the five-step 
process that was subsequently adopted by the EU.183  As definitional soft law, 
the OECD guidance makes clear that it “is the result of a collaborative initi-
ative among governments, international [organizations], industry and civil 
society to promote accountability and transparency in the supply chain of 
minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas.”184 
In addition to OECD and UN soft law, in 2008, the Electronic Industry 
Citizenship Coalition (“EICC”), now referred to as the Responsible Business 
Alliance (“RBA”), founded the Conflict-Free Smelter Program, which con-
sists of a list of conflict-free smelters and refiners.185  EICC, which is com-
prised of electronics companies in the United States, teamed up with the 
Global e-Sustainability Initiative, its European counterpart, to establish the 
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audited database of conflict-free smelters.186  The EICC is an example of in-
dustry regulating itself.  The members of the EICC have to include in their 
codes of conduct that they will refrain from using conflict minerals.187  Inter-
estingly, this initiative predates Section 1502 and is an example of trade as-
sociations and private actors regulating themselves in order to create trans-
parency in their international supply chains. 
C.  Potential Pitfalls of Soft Law Solutions 
The potential weaknesses associated with only using soft law to sanction 
certain behavior are the same weaknesses attributed to a toothless hard law.  
That is, there is a lack of accountability of those regulated when there are no 
enforcement mechanisms in place, nor any penalty associated with continu-
ing the sanctioned behavior.188  Moreover, there can be a significant issue 
with the legitimacy of soft law, which goes hand in hand with the lack of 
accountability and transparency within companies.189  Professors Roberta 
Karmel and Claire Kelly detail the issues surrounding legitimacy of soft law 
measures and stated, “In addition to normative considerations, legitimacy 
matters because it affects compliance.”190 
Nevertheless, the pitfalls associated with soft law are definitional; 
meaning, the very fact that soft law is comprised of non-binding principles 
and guidelines underscores its limitations.  However, the strides made by soft 
law in the realm of conflict minerals and supply chain transparency likely 
will be the legacy of Section 1502. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Section 1502 as hard law is deeply flawed and, thereby, a legislative 
failure.  Nevertheless, when seen as soft law, or simply a measure to enact 
normative changes in corporate and consumer behavior, there may be posi-
tive takeaways from this conflict minerals experiment. 
Although the jury may still be out on whether there will be a significant 
ripple effect from Section 1502 that will move the needle towards reduction 
of the conflict mineral trade, and optimistically a reduction of violence in the 
DRC, it is nevertheless worth considering how to leverage broadly the les-
sons of Section 1502.  There likely will be more written about the failure of 
Section 1502 than any success that can be attributed to the provision, but I 
contend that the success of Section 1502 may exist because of its failure.  
That is, public awareness of Section 1502 and, by extension, of the crisis in 
DRC hopefully will continue to motivate consumers, corporations, legisla-
tors, and others to fashion more effective solutions in the form of corporate 
social responsibility guidelines or otherwise.  This lesson suggests that there 
can be normative and societal benefits even in the wake of a hard law failure. 
